July..August 2003 - תַּמּוּז .. אָב .. אֱלוּל תשס״ג Tammuz..Av..Elul 5763

As I write this column the Roadmap to Peace has been off to a fitful start. What began with optimism and promise at Aqaba, Jordan, with President Bush, Prime Ministers Sharon and Abbas, and King Abdullah II, has been immediately and predictably challenged by terror and counter-violence. But this need not be the moment to succumb to pessimism and resignation.

I would like to share the thoughts of MJ Rosenberg, Director of Policy Analysis for Israel Policy Forum and former editor of AIPAC's Near East Report.

Despite the transparency of their strategy, the fanatics have succeeded. In 1996, implementation of the Oslo agreement was advancing rapidly. Prime Minister Shimon Peres was riding a wave of popularity following the murder of his partner Yitzhak Rabin. Peace was on the horizon. At that point, Hamas launched a wave of bombings that stopped Oslo in its tracks, defeated Shimon Peres, and caused Palestinians and Israelis to question whether peace had died with Rabin. By 1997, the peace process appeared to be a dead letter.

Then, as now, Hamas and its friends were in an exultant mood. Then, as now, their Israeli counterparts - like Rabin's assassin Yigal Amir and those who cheered him on - shared the sense of relief. Then, as now, those who feared and distrusted the idea of negotiations were able to hope that the threat of peace had passed.

But that is not what happened. Instead, the United States heightened its involvement. It set up a trilateral framework, under which Israeli and Palestinian security officials began regular meetings, in the presence of the CIA, to work out an anti-terror plan that would thwart the suicide bombers.

Initially, the Americans played the largest role in these meetings but, within a relatively short time, Israelis and Palestinians had established enough mutual trust that the American role was transformed from active mediator to mere observer.

The result was a Palestinian action plan to fight terror with implementation monitored by the United States. It worked. From the scores of terror victims in 1996 prior to direct CIA involvement, the number of victims inside Israel dropped dramatically following the CIA intervention. By the time of the Camp David summit in 2000 - after which security cooperation collapsed — the war on terrorism essentially had been won.

The lesson from 1996-1997 is that the peace process is not self-enforcing. The United States needs to be directly involved. Without continuous outside intervention, Israelis and Palestinians are simply not going to take the necessary actions to break the cycle of violence and counter violence, regardless of promises made to the White House. Unless American officials are on the scene, unless feet are held to the fire, neither side is going to summon up the will to end this insanity. (You can read the entire commentary called In the Face of Terror, at www.israelpolicyforum.org.)

The eternal optimist, I believe that the current violence need not dead-end the roadmap. We may simply be on a detour, but I believe that with the help of the United States, that can use the roadmap to find our way back to the path of peace.

Let's make real our prayers for peace (concluding every Amida), by waging peace every day.

Kein yehi ratzon. May this be God's will.

—Rabbi Harry A. Manhoff, Ph.D.

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